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Response to Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt 
Paper, “Fair Use as Resistance” 
Joseph S. Jenkins* 
 
The title of our conference today refers to a “discursive turn.” It is fitting that 
Betsy Rosenblatt’s paper focuses on Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin considers dialogics as 
the crucial form of the modern novel: one entire language or conventional way of 
speaking—including the world view implicit in it—approached and provoked from 
the perspective of another. 
We may be in the midst of Bakhtinian dialogics, right here in this room. This 
is a meeting of disciplines, each under the sway of different genre conventions. One 
relates to law schools, the law review article, which I tend to see, from the distance 
of the humanities, as responding to a kind of social-science convention—backed 
also, of course, by a more ancient pedigree: common law. Under this convention, a 
series of propositions, each backed by citation to collected facts and recognized 
authority, is arranged in the manner of logical deduction. I know this is not an 
ironclad rule; however, Betsy’s paper conforms to this convention. It is a fine and 
well-crafted example. 
Humanities “critical theory” responds to different conventions. Certainly 
from commercial lawyering’s point of view—and some of this seeps into law schools 
as well—critical theory complicates and far too much. I remember my first year, right 
out of Berkeley. I was a new associate in a big law firm. At some point, a third-year, 
a bit old to be an associate, started dropping by my office. At first, I thought these 
were kindly social calls, from someone higher up on the totem pole. He’d ask what 
I was working on, and then stroke his beard and wax philosophically, recalling in 
too-great detail the treatises that dealt with what he called “somewhat related 
matters.” Then when he was done, half hour or so, he’d ask me the name of the 
client and bill for the time—which of course did not please the partner in charge of 
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Thank you Dan, and UCI Law, for your kind invitation.  
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invoicing that client. Needless to say, this third-year associate soon disappeared. 
Complication is not prized by lawyers, looking for tangible, near-term results. 
But that’s not the convention in some other places. Ten years after that, I’m 
the little guy again: first-year grad student, UCLA, Comparative Literature. I’m 
doing all I can to get some grip on all these impossible theory books they’re telling 
us to read. And whenever I’d finally work up the nerve to say something in class, 
some snooty fourth-year student would stick up his nose and say, “Well, we might 
want to complicate that.” It always made me think of that billing partner, back at my 
old firm. 
And now more time rolls by, and you invite me here—pretty much to be the 
humanities theory guy, the “complicator.” And I don’t want to sound like an 
arrogant jerk, which is what I always thought of those fourth-year grad students. 
Also I admit, without hesitation, that you’ll never get near-term, tangible results by 
speaking the language of critical theory. It’s only in the long term, if we ever get 
there, that thinking discursively might help somewhat, in understanding plays of 
potentiality, lurking behind what we say. 
In short, my Bakhtin—he just happens to be mine, since I come at him now 
through Walter Benjamin, Hans Blumenberg, Giorgio Agamben, and some 
others—my Bakhtin I can only touch on lightly. Hard to pry him into the logic-
based conventions of the law review article. Even analogy—the thing you do in law 
with precedents—presses too hard on Bakhtin! Yes. At times he resorts to analogy, 
but he is most compelling, when he relates historical moments, distant in time and 
space, neither by analogy nor contiguity—neither by metaphor nor metonymy. 
Complicated, no? And who the hell’s got time for this? So I’ll just say a few 
short things and then sit down. 
Bakhtin is influential, in literary circles, for his theory of the novel. He traces 
what he calls the “prehistory” of the novel, back beyond classical Greece. He also 
gives special importance to Hellenic culture’s spread, including its interactions with 
Roman conquest: languages and cultures interact; experience is gained in seeing and 
thinking the world through more than one language. This facilitates perception and 
expression of particular language styles. And once you have an image of a language 
as a whole, you perceive, at least implicitly, the gap between any one language and 
the things outside language it tries to convey. This is an important intuition, crucial 
to political resistance. It renders the world view of a particular language merely 
conditional. 
However, in the ancient Roman world, according to Bakhtin, these dialogics 
I’ve just described are still scattered about: parody and travesty of different ways of 
speaking appear in various genres of the time—and in everyday life. They haven’t 
yet cohered into a single genre; this is a pre-history of the novel. Still, Bakhtin 
maintains that this Roman sense of humor is a larger contribution to Western 
cultures than Roman law. 
But something has to happen, before all this parody and travesty can congeal 
into the form of the modern novel. What happens is the rise of philology—study 
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of ancient texts, etc.—developing in the renaissance. This part is well known, and 
easy to understand, because we live still in cultures well-indebted to Greek and 
Roman classical texts, even if many people today do not know their names. What 
Bakhtin adds is that certain great renaissance texts—Rabelais, Cervantes, and 
Shakespeare, for example—were written subject to still-direct exposure to the 
grotesque realism of medieval carnival, which is itself indebted to that Roman sense 
of humor. This is an exposure that later writers—including those concerned with 
fair-use exceptions and their masters, I might add—cannot have lived directly. Later 
cultures have no direct experience with the carnivalesque, because it has been 
weakened and degraded in modernity, notably by the individualism that arises in the 
renaissance. 
The carnivalesque, for Bakhtin, is a language, a way of speaking, with a world 
view attached; it interacts with other languages. It also responds to differing 
historical circumstances. Certainly the renaissance brought great changes. But 
Bakhtin describes as well a more ancient moment, related to what he calls the 
“grotesque realism” of the carnivalesque. He traces it back to prehistoric moments, 
where a tribe enacts not only solemn religious rites, beseeching respectfully what it 
needs to survive, but also humiliates its god. The comic and the solemn are equally 
sacred. Later, in the early Christian era, clerics accommodated pagans, by lining up 
Christian holidays with traditional feast days. And they also had to tolerate the earthy 
humor of their rustic flocks—progeny of those god-humiliating tribes. 
A thousand years goes by and clergy still, not only tolerate, but engage 
themselves in witty Latin verses, vulgar dialogics,—like describing their needs to fill 
their bellies and empty their bowels in the Latin of the Church. The clergy enjoyed 
this, even those decidedly not rustic. Also there occurred a kind of unconcealment, 
inaccessible to those who see the world through a single language lens. Dialogical 
parody, including the carnivalesque, intuits the conditionality of supposedly 
unconditional “truths,” implied by particular language conventions. 
Bakhtin uses the word “indestructible” to describe this medieval “grotesque 
realism.” It includes not only town-market speech, but also the Latin parodies I’ve 
just mentioned. Rabelais, Cervantes, and Shakespeare are exposed directly to 
grotesque realism; at that time, its degradation, in modernity, is just beginning. Yet 
even in modernity, the carnivalesque impulse does not disappear; rather it is repressed 
by other discourses, under changing circumstances. 
Bakhtin uses the term “potentialities” in describing these movements of 
appearance and repression. This is a term much-used today by critical theory, in the 
tradition of Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben (you could also mention Freud 
and Jacques Lacan here). It’s not that the powerful grant permission for the 
carnivalesque to appear. It is rather that the potentiality of the dominant language 
(along with the value hierarchy presupposed by it) is itself constituted by other 
potentialities, even those repressed, with which it interacts. For example, the bloody 
dictator decides his next move, based on worried reads of street-crowd noise. Or a 
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duly elected president consults opinion polls, while deciding on the words for an 
upcoming speech. 
In modernity, according to Bakhtin, meanings that once attached to the 
carnivalesque become inaccessible. We today can’t read Rabelais as his early readers 
did, because the redemptive impulse, of Rabelais’ grotesque realism, is almost lost. It 
is nearly made incomprehensible, by individualistic presuppositions, with us in 
various forms since the renaissance. 
But we can take a stab at comprehending it. Bakhtin underlines that the 
carnivalesque is “nearly incomprehensible”; what is repressed or cancelled insists on 
return. So here’s the stab: we can understand, intellectually, that the medieval 
carnivalesque redeems each mortal death, seeing each person as part of a greater 
human mass. Each death fertilizes some new birth—and takes it laughingly. Change 
is the essence, metamorphosis. Here is where Bakhtin comes close to accepting an 
unconditional truth. Ancient laughing hags w pregnant bellies, which we may have 
trouble relating to; as opposed to Michelangelo’s statue of David, represented as 
complete unto himself, serenely independent of his surroundings, individualized. 
I’ve got to stop here, since time is moving on. Before you know it, David’s 
rump is wrinkled, and he’s starting to get a paunch. If I had some more time, I’d try 
to relate Bakhtin to copyright’s kowtow to “originality,” which Betsy’s paper ably 
critiques—through a different convention. One of the most important points Betsy 
makes is that fair use is shadowed by low moral status, because of its treatment, as 
a mere exception, neighbored by pirates, under current law. 
I would add something—but it would be of course annoyingly complicated. 
I’d juxtapose what copyright calls “original” with what Walter Benjamin calls 
“originary.” This marks a play of potentialities that is readable as well in Bakhtin’s 
writings—the one writing under Hitler, the other under Stalin (where maybe 
complication was a try for self-protection). 
What I might say would have something to do with authority granted to 
tradition, as opposed to innovation; what is old versus what is new; redemptive grace 
controlled by the forebear, versus control by the follower. This involves a puzzle 
that’s been with us all, ever since Jacob wrestled with the angel. 
Thank you. 
 
